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Social Media and U.S. Intelligence Agencies: Just Trending or a
Real Tool to Engage and Educate?
Abstract
Social media use has become ubiquitous not just among individuals, groups, and
businesses, but also government institutions. In turn, the adoption of services like
Facebook and Twitter in the public sector has increasingly become the focus of academic
study. U.S. intelligence agencies, however, have been excluded from examination. The
potential benefits—engagement, education, and transparency, among others—are
significant, and studying how U.S. intelligence uses social media will help us realize those
benefits. In the arcane, complex and potentially intrusive world of intelligence, new
opportunities to bolster public knowledge and accountability must be utilized. Today,
understanding government requires studying e-government, and in intelligence, social
media likely represents the most direction connection between citizens and the public
agencies that serve them. To take a first step, this study maps how U.S. intelligence
agencies are using Facebook and Twitter, examines other social media practices, and
presents findings from correspondence with four intelligence and security journalists.
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Introduction
The Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative has compelled U.S.
federal agencies to increase efforts at government openness, information sharing
with the public, accountability and engagement.1 For many federal entities, this
has included the establishment of a social media presence—a combined 3,000
Facebook pages2 and 1,000 Twitter accounts,3 making them the most commonly
used services in the federal government. Least common are Flickr and the use of
blogs.4
The prevalent use of social media by government is not just true at the federal
level. Even at the local level, governments in the United States are using social
media in huge numbers. Norris and Reddick found ninety-four percent of local
governments have created social media accounts.5 The potential benefits of this
still young phenomenon are many, though skeptics and limits abound to be sure.
A number of early findings suggest that practice may not quite be living up to
potential.
U.S. intelligence agencies have also become a part of this phenomenon, with
many of the major national intelligence agencies creating Facebook and Twitter
accounts. The limitations of what intelligence agencies can do and share on social
media are somewhat obvious. Nonetheless, the establishment of social media
pages is indicative of new opportunities for interface between the Intelligence
Community (IC) and the public, perhaps with a role to play for the news media.
And while scholars have begun to look at social media as a tool for intelligence
collection and analysis (social media intelligence, or SOCMINT),6 studies on the
use of social media by intelligence agencies to inform, engage, education and
interact have yet to materialize. Any gain in the public’s knowledge on
intelligence issues and operations—outside of the rightly classified context—
should be viewed as a tremendous societal benefit. Understanding broader issues
and practices is wholly doable, if perhaps a lofty goal, and can better equip the
public with a base from which they can induce legislative and political actions
consistent with and constrained by public preferences. Thus, social media, if used

John T. Snead, “Social Media Use in the U.S. Executive Branch,” Government Information
Quarterly 30 (2013): 56-63.
2 Ines Mergel, “Social Media Adoption and Resulting Tactics in the U.S. Federal Government,”
Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013): 123-130.
3 Staci M. Zavattaro and Arthur J. Sementelli, “A Critical Examination of Social Media Adoption
in Government: Introducing Omnipresence,” Government Information Quarterly 31 (2014): 257264.
4 Snead, “Social Media Use in the U.S. Executive Branch.”
5 Donald F. Norris and Christopher G. Reddick, “Local E-Government in the United States:
Transformation or Incremental Change,” Public Administration Review 73 (2013): 165-175.
6 David Omand, Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, “Introducing Social Media Intelligence
(SOCMINT),” Intelligence and National Security 6:27 (December, 2012): 801-823; Joshua
Rovner, “Intelligence in the Twitter Age,” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 2:26 (Summer, 2013): 260-271.
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and received well, can strengthen the accountability chain between the public,
political principals, and intelligence “agents.”
This study is a first step to fill that gap, and has three core objectives: to
understand the ways in which intelligence agencies are using social media to
present themselves to the world; to get an early look at how fully and dynamically
these organizations are utilizing social media; and to contribute to the full
utilization of these tools—even in agencies that operate on the basis of secrecy
and security. Only by studying and understanding how these tools are being used
can their benefits be entirely realized. This study will help shed light on whether
or not intelligence agencies are taking social media seriously, or if they are simply
going along with the trend because “everyone is doing it.”
Through this research, we can begin to develop insight into the veracity of the
various social media platforms. “Mapping” the content being posted by
intelligence agencies is thus a necessary first step. If the content of social media is
not substantive and interesting, it is likely that the public will lose interest and
disengage.7 This study will also create the knowledge sets to then begin
investigating the processes and people “behind the scenes” in the social media
staffs producing and posting content. And with a picture of how these services are
being used, studying this phenomenon from the citizen perspective becomes
more practical (including things like sentiment analysis, which is enabled by
social media analytic tools).
To execute this study, ninety consecutive days of Facebook posts by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA),
the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were manually coded to
form a grounded map of social media activity. The same was done for sixty
consecutive days of Twitter tweets for the ODNI and NSA. This map will in turn
inform the study’s core research questions, many of which are essentially
borrowed from the extant literature on social media in government. Other factors
and metrics used to study social media will also be examined. Journalists who
specialize in security and intelligence matters were surveyed to understand if and
how they use social media as part of their job, as well as how they view the
content made available on the social media sites of intelligence agencies. There
are potential “multiplier effects” of journalist use of these resources, if journalists
rely on them and find them to be valuable.
The next section will introduce the concept of social media in government, track
contemporary developments, discuss promise and limits, and provide an
overview of what we have learned to date about the practice of social media in
government. That is followed by a more extended discussion of social media in
Sara Hofmann, Daniel Beverungen, Michael Rackers and Jorg Becker, “What Makes Local
Governments’ Online Communities Successful? Insights from a Multi-Method Analysis of
Facebook,” Government Information Quarterly, 30 (2013): 387-396.
7
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intelligence, leading into the study’s sampling rationale, specific research
questions, methods and findings. A summary discussion and conclusion round
out the paper, outlining key observations and needed future research directions.
Social Media in Government Organizations
Social media includes a number of services and platforms that we have all
become very familiar with: social networking (Facebook), micro-blogging, wikis,
and media sharing (YouTube). Social media services are usually maintained as
third-party platforms, and allow users to create profiles and content, share their
own and other content, and connect and dialogue with others, among other
things. Individuals as well as organizations can become part of these online
communities and forums. The use of social media is considered the fifth wave of
government information and communication technology, preceded by
mainframes, central timeshare systems, personal computers and online services.8
It is a core facet of Web 2.0, which is characterized by user-generated content and
online identities and communities. More simple forms of social media were
certainly used by people and government prior to the Web 2.0 era, including
things like bulletin boards.9
As noted above, the administration of Barack Obama issued its Open
Government Initiative and Directive and the Web 2.0 phenomenon has been
firmly established in federal government agencies. There is certainly a norm and
expectation that organizations use social media to extend their presence and
provide easier access to government information. After all, social media allows
government to meet people “where they are,” with the frequently posited benefits
of public education, engagement and participation, service provision,
collaborative efforts and co-production, openness, transparency and
accountability, trust building, and communication efficiency.
There are an equal number of potential concerns regarding the real efficacy of
government use of social media. Still in the early going, the benefits of social
media in government remain an open question for a variety of reasons. First,
political risks accompany the use of social media. Mistakes and missteps can
result in backfires and unintended consequences, possibly upsetting constituents
and dampening agency use. Thus, the vetting of information and interaction on
social media can hinder the twenty-four-hour, real-time nature of social media
interaction. There is also the possibility that agencies use social media in a
protective fashion in order to maintain or serve their own reputations.

Stuart I. Bretschneider and Ines Mergel, “Technology and Public Management Information
Systems: Where We Have Been and Where Are We Going,” in Donald C. Menzel and Harvey L.
White (eds.), The State of Public Administration: Issues, Problems and Challenges (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2011), 187-203.
9 John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Derek Hansen, “The Impact of Policies on Government
Social Media Usage: Issues, Challenges, and Recommendations,” Government Information
Quarterly 29 (2012): 30-40.
8
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When using sites like Facebook and Twitter, governments cede control to the
third-party vendors who maintain social media sites, making it more difficult to
ensure that content is properly maintained and protected. Another issue is the
“digital divide,” the problem that certain demographics and individuals may not
have equal access to online forums. Another critique or concern is that national
security organizations cannot make use of social media given the nature of their
work. However, such organizations are in fact using social media, and it remains
an empirical question as to what can and is being accomplished.
Experimentation and “constructive chaos” have described much of the unfolding
use of social media by the U.S. federal government.10 Federal agencies have tested
and tinkered with various tools and approaches (ironically settling on the more
basic uses), relying on observation of citizen use and preferences, the practices of
other agencies, peer interaction, and formal guidelines.11 The result is the use of
social media as a “pure broadcasting mechanism,”12 simply “pushing” existing
information through new channels. These dynamics have also been observed
abroad and down to the local level,13 with trial and error approaches resulting in
pre-Web 2.0 tactics.14
To be sure, there have been positive and effective uses of social media, including
in the realm of security and foreign policy. Social media has proven effective in
emergency management and security threat scenarios, in some cases with the
crucial aid of respected journalists.15 The U.S. Department of State has adopted
the practice of receiving and responding to citizen and journalist questions on
matters of foreign policy and diplomacy16. Conversely, the Transportation
Security Administration has edited the public comments posted on their social
media sites,17 a practice that has been exhibited elsewhere as well and can serve
to dampen user interest.18
Ines Mergel, “Social Media Adoption: Toward a Representative, Responsive or Interactive
Government?” Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference on Digital Government Research
(2014).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Norris and Reddick, “Local E-Government in the United States”; Sergio Picazo-Vela, Isis
Gutierrez-Martinez and Luis Felipe Luna-Reyes, “Understanding Risks, Benefits, and Strategic
Alternatives of Social Media Applications in the Public Sector,” Government Information
Quarterly 29 (2012): 504-511.
14 Hofmann et al., “What Makes Local Governments’ Online Communication Successful?”
15 Michael J. Magro, “A Review of Social Media Use in E-Government,” Administrative Sciences, 2
(2012): 148-161; Deanne Bird, Megan Ling and Katharine Haynes, “Flooding Facebook: The Use
of Social Media During the Queensland and Victorian Floods,” Australian Journal of Emergency
Management 27 (2012): 27-33; Kyujin Jung and Han Woo Park, “Citizens’ Social Media Use and
Homeland Security Information Policy: Some Evidence from Twitter users during the 2013 North
Korea Nuclear Test,” Government Information Quarterly 31 (2014): 563-572.
16 Ines Mergel, “The Social Media Innovation Challenge in the Public Sector,” Information Polity
17 (2012): 281-292.
17 John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger and Justin M. Grimes, “Promoting Transparency and
Accountability through ICTs, Social Media, and Collaborative E-Government,” Transforming
Government: People, Process and Policy 1:6 (2012): 78-91.
18 Zavattaro and Sementelli, “A Critical Examination of Social Media Adoption in Government.”
10
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Social Media in U.S. Intelligence Organizations
Prior to the internet explosion of the 1990s, and the subsequent onset of Web 2.0,
some U.S. intelligence agencies were not yet publicly recognizing their own
existence. The National Security Agency was given the somewhat joking moniker
“No Such Agency.” Today, these same agencies are known by millions, “liked” by
at least thousands, and voluntarily posting to keep the public, media, and others
apprised of, well, something about them. This public relations adjustment is quite
a shift, and arguably provides the most robust and direct interface between U.S.
intelligence organizations and the publics they work for. These considerations
alone demonstrate the importance of understanding this phenomenon.
This new dynamic between intelligence agencies and the public creates new
opportunities for openness and accountability in a policy realm that is arcane,
critical to public security and liberty, and exhibits increasingly powerful
capabilities. While much of what is done by intelligence agencies must remain
classified, not everything is secret, and issues and functions can be addressed at a
responsible level of detail. This can include creative and innovative new practices,
such as crowdsourcing and Town Hall-style meetings. There are likely other
potential inventive and engaging uses that have not yet been identified, and some
encouraging uses were found in this study.
Research Objectives and Questions
This paper seeks to understand the ways in which U.S. intelligence agencies are
using social media not as a tool to collect or analyze intelligence, but as a tool to
present themselves outwardly and engage with the public in various ways. Thus,
the coding scheme developed captures the various uses of social media by the five
selected organizations. A leading question is whether or not the agencies are
posting content and features that exhibit the best uses of social media
(substantive information, interactional facets). Conversely, are they distributing
more peripheral information and in a one-directional (or “push-based”) fashion.
Said differently, does use of Facebook and Twitter seem to be serving meaningful
educational ends? Are the new opportunities social media platforms provide
being robustly utilized, or are the agencies simply using these services to push
information that is already in circulation? To investigate these questions, the
paper will look most closely at:






Facebook and Twitter activity within the individual agencies
(quantitatively and qualitatively)
The aggregation of those findings across the five agencies
Counts of the number of replicated and shared posts
Conversely, counts of original posts
The content found in the category “agency functions”
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Additional considerations include the number of followers each agency has (a
relatively crude participation metric), a review of the other social media being
used by the selected agencies, and the accessibility of social media links on the
home pages of the CIA, DIA, NSA, ODNI and NGA. The findings will be
presented separately for Facebook and Twitter so that a unique picture of each
can be painted.
Journalists have proven instrumental in supporting security agencies use of
social media, and social media also provides journalists with another source of
information and potential stories.19 Given their placement, if journalists are
finding the social media sites of intelligence agencies to be informative and
helpful, there can be significant multiplier effects.
Sampling and Methods
The agencies selected for this study—the DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA and ODNI—each
have national intelligence functions and together represent a significant portion
of the IC. They also offer a diverse set of responsibilities: all-source analysis, ICwide management, warfighter support, and signals intelligence. Data were taken
from the Facebook sites of these agencies from September 15, 2014 to December
15, 2015 and the Twitter feeds of the ODNI and NSA from October 15, 2014 to
December 15, 2015. One caveat is that the data were saved in chunks, meaning
that if agencies posted content and then removed it, it will not be captured in this
study. In a sense, this actually reflects a potentially important dynamic and limit
of social media.
A review and content analysis of the data resulted in a coding scheme of eleven
categories (plus a miscellaneous category), and in turn a grounded map of social
media activity. The categories arrived at are as follows:













19

Agency functions
History
Recruitment
Honors and commemoration
News articles
Holiday wishes
Events
Interactive features
Public statements (written and in-person)
Site maintenance
Technical assistance (only found in Twitter data)
Miscellaneous

Jung and Park, “Citizens’ Social Media Use and Homeland Security Information Policy.”
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A greater focus was placed on Facebook as it has thus far proven to be more
commonly used by federal agencies. Thus, the findings on Twitter should be
viewed with slightly higher skepticism, as it includes less agencies and less time.
Another limit is that tweets can “stack up” around single events or issues on a
given day, warping or biasing somewhat the study results. These cases will be
noted for readers.
The study also sought a convenience sample of security and intelligence
journalists at major news outlets. Journalists were asked about how often they
access the social media sites of intelligence agencies, which social sites they
tended to use, for what purposes they check and utilize these sites, and their
views on the nature and quality of social media content. The five questions asked
are provided in their entirety below. Journalists agreed to participate on the basis
of anonymity, and thus their names and organizational affiliations will not be
included in this paper.
Study Findings
Facebook and U.S. Intelligence Organizations
The five intelligence organizations selected for this study posted a combined 186
times to their Facebook pages between September 15, 2014 and December 15,
2014. The CIA was most active (fifty-five posts), followed by the NSA (forty-four),
NGA (thirty-eight), DIA (thirty-five) and ODNI (fourteen). Of these 186 total
posts, 104 were shares of existing content. Most of these shared posts were from
other sites and organizations (fifty-seven of ninety-six), and the remainder (fortyseven of ninety-six) were agencies replicating their own information that had
originated elsewhere, typically their own websites. Thus, more than half (fifty-six
percent) of all the posted content was replication of existing information, and the
remainder were unique posts intended for the Facebook platform. In some cases,
reposted content came with additional content, usually in the form of narrative,
and those cases were coded as unique posts, not shared ones. In these cases, the
shared portion was generally provided in the event that the user wanted to “read
more.” Thus, the calculations presented here are conservative in nature. And, of
course, sharing does mean that information is being distributed more broadly,
making it more likely people will access information.
Overall, the most common type of post was connected to history and past events
(twenty-two percent)—driven largely by the CIA. Commemorations and honors
(most typically of those who served in military or intelligence) were close behind
at sixteen percent. Agency functions, a category to be returned to in more depth
below, constituted twelve percent of all posts. The reposting of news stories
totaled eleven percent of all activity, and recruitment outreach ten percent. The
remaining categories were all less than ten percent (holiday wishes, agency
events, public statements, and interactive features).
The CIA, the most active “poster” on Facebook, tended to provide information on
history and past events (often interesting gadgetry or operations) and honored
73
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fallen military and intelligence personnel. The NSA most typically posted for
purposes of recruitment and outreach, followed by interactive features (the
weekly Cryptologic Challenge). The NGA posted most about their own functions,
followed by the replication of news stories. The DIA tended to post content
related to honors and agency special events. Lastly, the ODNI, which only posted
fourteen times in the ninety-day period under examination, provided mostly
information on agency functions and honors and commemorations. The ODNI
posts were almost exclusively shares of content found on other websites or social
media pages.
Even within the more substantive category of ‘agency functions,’ which is broadly
construed to include the actual work and operations of the selected intelligence
agencies, the information provided still tended to be peripheral or secondary.
This is not to say substantive information was absent altogether. For example,
following the Senate’s report on CIA practices in the War on Terror, the CIA
responded by repeatedly posting statements relating to the charges. Those who
follow the CIA, or check in on the CIA’s Facebook page, would have found a
rather detailed, if not defensive, retort explaining the agency’s position and
practice. The agency stated that it had not actively worked to deceive executive
and legislative branch officials, as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
had charged, and that its advanced interrogation techniques had been ended.
While these responses may not be surprising, and certainly do not lead to the end
of the story for an interested “follower,” they certainly engage a very important
contemporary issue in intelligence policy and provide a relatively in-depth
discussion of the agency’s operations and perspectives.
Also in the category of agency functions, the NGA posted a report on its “analytic
environment” in the year 2020, and also provided information on their
operations in support of agencies like the US Geological Survey and Library of
Congress. Other posts in this category included campus visits by key legislators
and reports that new high-level officials had come to an agency. Posts that were
included in other categories—news stories, public statements—while not terribly
frequent, can also include more substantive content on agency operations. Such
posts included profiles of and interviews with high-level officials. Included in
this category are agency news magazines, such as NGA’s Pathfinder, which for
example included a story on the use of gamification (providing badges for
professional accomplishments—perhaps slightly infantilizing). The only agency to
offer no posts related to agency functions was the National Security Agency, still
perhaps hewing to the “No Such Agency” reputation of before, but in a new era of
government expectations and practice.
Near the end of July 2015, the DIA had approximately 314,000 followers, the CIA
454,000, the NSA 224,000, the ODNI 120,000, and the NGA 62,000. Given that
Facebook is closing in on nearly 1 billion followers,20 these numbers do not paint
a picture of wide public engagement with the social media sites of intelligence
20

Snead, “Social Media Use in the U.S. Executive Branch.”
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agencies. Additionally, there is certainly an issue of selection bias here, with those
already interested in intelligence likely to “like” and follow. This is an underlying
weakness of social media, and it certainly seems the average person is not
following intelligence agencies using social media. So, questions remain on the
audience being reached, the way that audience is being engaged, and the
multiplier effects of that audience’s use of social media.
Twitter and U.S. Intelligence Organizations (ODNI, NSA)
In July 2015 the ODNI was up to 34,000 followers on Twitter, and like on
Facebook, the ODNI almost exclusively shared preexisting information from
other sources and intelligence agencies (for a total of 82 tweets). Approximately a
quarter of this content was coded as agency functions, giving the ODNI’s Twitter
feed a somewhat substantive bent. Examples of these tweets include budget
figures, IARPA projects, document releases, and the establishment of new offices.
The ODNI also frequently tweeted in reference to IC on the Record (which it
operates on Tumblr), though these tweets could come in clumps. For example,
the ODNI tweeted almost twenty times in a single day regarding an IC on the
Record Q and A session (the NSA did the same, though not with quite as many
tweets). This frequent, bordering on frenetic, tweeting is to be expected in the
dense, in-the-moment realm of Twitter. A single tweet is likely to simply get lost
in the barrage of other information users and followers receive on a daily basis.
The NSA was comparatively more active on Twitter than the ODNI, offering 131
tweets in the two-month period examined. A majority of these tweets consisted of
sharing and retweeting information and posts from other sources and sites.
Seventy-six of these tweets were shares or retweets of other sources, while
twenty-two were replications of NSA information. The NSA most frequently
posted on events, often as they were happening, involving the agency or agency
officials. In fact, half of all NSA tweets were connected to events. Such events
included the NSA Director attending RAND and Stanford events and kids being
invited to the White House for a coding activity. Many of these tweets were
connected to a small number of events (essentially, repeat tweets).
The NSA did frequently share information and documents intended to help the
public and organizations secure their computers and networks from viruses and
hackers. This was done sixteen times in two months. As of late July, 2015 NSA’s
Twitter account was being followed by nearly 65,000 people, compared to
224,000 on Facebook.
Other Social Media Uses and Practices
Of the agencies selected for this study, the CIA demonstrated the broadest use of
social media platforms. As of early spring in 2015, the CIA website offered links
to its Flickr, Google+, YouTube and Pinterest pages (as well as Facebook and
Twitter). The links are not all located in the same place however, and are not on
the top of the homepage, a practice recommended in the literature to improve
75
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visibility and increase use.21 Flickr and YouTube are available on the homepage
(multiple times actually), but the other links are found on the news and
information page. Additionally, the CIA maintains a blog on its website.
Table 1: Other Social Media Use (Linked through home websites)*

CIA

Flick
r
X

Google
+
X

YouTu
be
X

LinkedI
n

NSA
DIA
ODN
X
I
NGA
*As of March 2015

Tumb
lr

Pintere
st
X

Instagra
m

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

The ODNI also maintains Flickr, YouTube, Scribd and Tumblr accounts, with all
links available on the top section of the homepage. The DIA provides links to
YouTube, Instagram and LinkedIn on its homepage, though at the bottom of the
screen. The NGA and NSA each provide only one additional link (beyond
Facebook and Twitter) on their homepages. The NGA has a link to LinkedIn near
the top of its homepage, and the NSA to IC on the Record, which is hosted on
Tumblr.
Journalists, Social Media and U.S. Intelligence Organizations
Another potential value-adding implication of intelligence agency use of social
media is how journalists at major media outlets utilize this new information
source. The news media can serve a “multiplier effect,” a magnifying interface
between intelligence agencies and the public. Reporters can also use the content
provided on these sites to grow their own knowledge, raise new questions or
develop new stories. Jung and Park have shown that reporters can serve as
needed intermediaries between security and intelligence agencies and the general
public.22
To investigate these dynamics, the author corresponded with four reporters from
a variety of major outlets, including big city newspapers, online-only outlets, and
multinational news organizations. While this is certainly not a large or scientific
participant base, each of the reporters works for a major outlet and is thus in a
uniquely critical position. Study participants answered the following five
questions:

21
22

Ibid.
Jung and Park, “Citizens’ Social Media Use and Homeland Security Information Policy.”
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1. How often do you look at the social media pages of intelligence
agencies? What social media sites are you more likely to use to
find information?
2. Do you use the social media pages of intelligence agencies to
learn about intelligence issues and programs?
3. Have you used the social media pages of U.S. intelligence
agencies to identify or develop news stories that you’ve
researched or written? If so, could you please explain?
4. Do you think the content posted on these social media pages is
of informational and educational value to the general public?
5. How often do you “re-post” or “re-tweet” content you find on the
social media sites of intelligence agencies?
While study participants often described the content provided on the social
media pages as thin and not particularly helpful (for them, or the general public),
some passively “follow” U.S. intelligence agencies on Twitter. While three of four
participants stated they follow the Twitter accounts of intelligence agencies, only
one mentioned Facebook, and the use noted was reactive, that is, for a specific
issue or story. Three out of the four participants also cited the ODNI’s IC on the
Record Tumblr account as an important resource. Regarding IC on the Record,
participants said the following:
“IC on the Record…that’s actually a fairly decent source for the official line
on…programs.”
“One exception I think is ODNI’S ‘ICONTHERECORD’ Tumblr. It has
been genuinely useful to have a central repository of declassified
documents from the government that is far more use-friendly than the
FOIA reading rooms or other cluttered ways in which other agencies have
tended to make declassified documents available.”
In addition to information on declassified documents and information, IC on the
Record serves a number of other functions. The Tumblr page also offers followers
Q and A sessions with IC officials (which many tweets brought attention to),
budget information, access to speeches and interviews, and other key public
intelligence and national security reports. Further study with a singular focus on
IC on the Record is probably a good idea.
What will be noticed in the first quote above is that social media is a good source
for “the official line,” an observation that was echoed by others, with one reporter
stating that the information and commentary found on the social media sites of
intelligence agencies can border on propaganda. But, it seems that one of the
most common and helpful uses of social media is to access official statements and
77
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documents issued by intelligence agencies. Thus, rather than learning about new
programs, issues or stories, reporters use social media to gather official
statements on matters already identified. One participant noted his interest in
tracking what intelligence (and military) agencies “don’t post.”
However, the information on Twitter pages was described as not very
substantive. One participant said “tweets don’t often contain much useful
information.” This participant added that following intelligence agencies’ social
media will not give individuals (the public) much knowledge on operations and
priorities. Another felt that social media content would only be informative to
those who already have “deep interests in the subject at hand.” Reposting of
social media content by reporters was not common, though it was done by a
number of participants in certain circumstances. Thus, the direct value to the
public of the social media pages of U.S. intelligence agencies, at least to date, is
limited in the eyes of leading intelligence reporters.
Discussion
While there was divergence in use among the various intelligence agencies
included in this study, the above analysis does not necessarily paint a picture of
social media as a robust tool of public transparency, engagement and education.
To begin, a relatively small number of people follow intelligence agencies on
Facebook and Twitter. Those who do are likely more favorably disposed to
intelligence agencies, and are probably already quite knowledgeable. And given
the sheer volume of traffic that comes across individuals’ Facebook and Twitter
feeds, as well as the limits placed on what comes across feeds, even these
individuals are likely to miss lots of what is posted. Of course, followers (and nonfollowers) can repost Facebook and Twitter content, and non-followers can visit
the social media pages of intelligence agencies.
Much of what is found on the Facebook and Twitter pages of US intelligence
agencies is replicated from other sources, rather than original content. This is, of
course, not necessarily a bad thing. Social media affords direct and efficient
channels to distribute information to the public, allowing for greater reach, even
if that reach is used to simply “push” out content that is already available.
It is, of course, perhaps naïve to expect to be educated about intelligence agencies
by the agencies themselves. But, as some of the reporters commented, getting
quick access to the “official line” and other declassified information represents a
gain—even if in some cases those benefits come from being observant about what
intelligence agencies do not comment on. But, being sensitive to what is not there
is probably something limited to experts, such as intelligence journalists.
Given the relative lack of emphasis placed on more substantive information, the
“pushing” of existing content, and the minimal amount of interactive use of social
media, it might be safe to conclude that intelligence agencies are exercising due
diligence more than anything else. To not be a part of this trend would defy
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federal directives and also give the appearance of being out of touch or even
evasive.
Conclusion
This is the first foray into the study of how U.S. intelligence organizations are
using social media as a tool for education, engagement, and transparency. Much
more remains to be done, including examination of the other social media sites
used by intelligence agencies. Future studies can also expand the number of
intelligence agencies being examined and the time frame examined. It is
important to learn which platforms work best for which agencies and which
purposes, a question that will partly be explored through studying how people
perceive and use the various social media services. Sentiment and network
analysis of social media followers can add yet another dimension to our
understanding of the phenomenon, as can more robust evaluations of
participation, beyond “likes,” “followers,” and “re-tweets.” Social media analytics
offer a range of capacities that will add greatly to the grounded, contextual
approach taken in this paper.
Gaining access to the stories and processes behind the content is also an
important research objective for this agenda. Surveying and interviewing social
media directors and managers will provide that key additional dimension. While
this study sought to explain “what” comes out of the process, it’s also important
to understand the “how” of the process, and ultimately “who” is engaging with the
social media of U.S. intelligence organizations.
To better understand twenty-first century governance, the information age and
living in an e-society, we must closely track these new developments and
contribute to the furthering of their prospects and possibilities. Social media may
not produce all of the many benefits ascribed to it, though with proper attention
and guidance, it certainly can do more than what critics suggest. Social media is a
growing and changing phenomenon, not a fixed one. The best uses and
innovations in social media, including in the context of intelligence organizations,
are hopefully yet to come. Simply said, what happens with social media is largely
a function of what society, people, practitioners and scholars want out of it. From
the starting point that intelligence accountability and public education are
increasingly important, and that social media affords an opportunity to
strengthen both, the study of how intelligence agencies use social media must
join the different intelligence studies literatures.
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